We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal policy is described by a firmspecific subsidy schedule that is contingent on firms' quality choices. The subsidy schedule not only corrects the distortion in product quality but also selects the socially preferred equilibrium. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analyzed.
The Model
The model is a version of the standard model of vertical differentiation. 5 There is a continuum of consumers indexed by θ, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with density one. Each consumer is assumed to either buy one unit of the vertically differentiated good or nothing. Consumer θ's (indirect) utility is given by u = θq − p if he buys one unit of a product of quality q ∈ [0, ∞) at price p ∈ [0, ∞). His utility is zero if he buys nothing.
There are two firms in the market. Each firm offers a single product. The marginal and average production costs are assumed to be invariant with respect to both quality and quantity. 6 For simplicity, we let these costs be zero. The cost of product R&D is different across firms. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 2 has lower technology so that it has to incur higher cost of product R&D than firm 1 for the same q. Let F (q) be 4 See, for example, Lambertini and Mosca (1999) and Toshimitsu (2003) for the case of product R&D and Spence (1984) and Lahiri and Ono (1999) for the case of process R&D. 5 See, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Sutton (1982, 1983) , Ronnen (1991) , and Aoki (2003) . firm 1's cost of product R&D. Firm 2's R&D cost is given by γF (q), where γ ≥ 1. We assume F (q) = kq n , where k is a positive constant and n is any integer such that n ≥ 2.
The government implements R&D policy, which is potentially a subsidy schedule. Let s i < 1 be a subsidy for firm i. A negative s i means an R&D tax. Taking the duopolistic market structure as given, the government chooses s i to maximize social welfare W , which is the sum of firm's profits (π i ) and consumer's surplus (CS) minus social cost of subsidy:
where R i is firm i's revenue. The government chooses R&D policy in stage 1. In stage 2 firms simultaneously choose the quality of their products. In stage 3 firms compete either in prices or in quantities. The solution is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
R&D Policy under Bertrand Competition

Revenue and quality best-response
In this section, we examine the case in which firms compete in prices at the final stage.
Each firm's equilibrium revenue in stage 3 is given by
for i, j = 1, 2. 
with q 
The third property implies that qualities are strategic complements.
Each firm's quality best-response curve is depicted in Figure 1 . In the figure, the solid lines of B i represent firm i's quality best-response in the unregulated market. B 1 (resp. B 2 ) is discontinuous at q 2 =q 2 (0) (resp. q 1 =q 1 (γ, 0)).
Optimal R&D policy
Nash equilibria (NEs) in stage 2 are shown in the following lemma:
(Proofs of lemmas and propositions are presented in the Appendix.)
When the technology gap is small, the firm with inferior technology may choose a higher quality than the firm with superior technology. As a result, there exist multiple equilibria. When the technology gap is sufficiently large, on the other hand, the inferior firm has no incentive to leapfrog the rival and hence the equilibrium is unique, as shown by Zhou et al. (2002) .
In Figure 1 , the two NEs in the unregulated market are given by the intersections of the solid lines of B 1 (q 2 ; s 1 ) and B 2 (q 1 ; γ, s 2 ) at E 1 and E 2 .
We now examine the socially optimal quality pair and the R&D policy to induce firms to choose the socially optimal quality pair. Let q H iS and q L jS be qualities of the high and low quality products, respectively, that maximize social welfare when firm i (resp. firm j) produces a high (resp. low) quality product. Then, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 2 For a given
In Figure 1 the quality pairs (q
and S 2 . The third result in Lemma 2 implies that S 1 is socially preferred to S 2 . In other words, social welfare is higher when firm 1, the firm with superior technology, produces a higher quality product. Because of this property, the following two roles are required to the government policy: The first role is to correct the distortion in firms' quality choices and the second role is to select the socially preferred equilibrium. The optimal R&D policy in the case of small technology gap is then as shown in the following proposition: 
where s 
One example is drawn in Figure 1 . Effects of the other elements in (4) and (5) are not seen in the figure, because they affect the undrawn parts of B 1 and B 2 .
As a corollary of Proposition 1, the optimal R&D policies in cases of γ = 1 and sufficiently large γ are obtained.
Corollary 1 (i)
If γ = 1, the single subsidy schedule is an optimal R&D policy:
where s
There are two SPNE outcomes, which are identical except for the identity of the firms.
(ii) If γ is sufficiently large, a combination of
an optimal R&D policy. There is a unique SPNE, in which q 1 > q 2 .
in (5) . The second part of the corollary is obtained by substitutingŝ 1 = s (4) and (5) and choosing equalities for all elements in the schedules (4) and (5).
Corollary 1 implies that the symmetric and the large gap cases are special cases of the small gap case. If γ = 1, the optimal policy is still a subsidy schedule. However, the schedule is not necessarily firm-specific, because social welfare is independent of the identity of the firms. If γ is sufficiently large, on the other hand, the traditional flat subsidy can be optimal, while the subsidy rate has to be firm-specific. Since the unregulated NE is unique in this case, the R&D policy has only to correct the distortion in product quality.
Note that even when the NE in the unregulated market is unique, the policy specified in Corollary 1 (ii) may create an NE where q 1 < q 2 , if the technology gap is not significantly large. In other words, the flat subsidy to each firm may cause the multiple equilibria.
That case is included in the small gap case rather than the large gap case.
R&D Policy under Cournot Competition
We now turn to the case in which firms compete in quantities in the final stage. Each firm's equilibrium revenue in stage 3 is given by
for i, j = 1, 2.
Firms 1 and 2's profits are given by
, and
, respectively. 
The third and fourth properties imply that qualities are strategic complements for the higher quality producer and strategic substitutes for the lower quality producer.
With a small technology gap, there exist two asymmetric pure-strategy NEs in stage
The situation is depicted in Figure 2 .
The solid lines ofB i represent firm i's quality best-response in the unregulated market.
It is upward sloping for q i > q j and downward sloping for q i < q j . The two NEs are given by the intersections ofB 1 andB 2 atẼ 1 andẼ 2 .
The main difference from the Bertrand case is that subsidy for the firm producing a lower quality product is negative in this case. That is, R&D tax rather than subsidy should be applied to the low quality producer. The optimal subsidy for the high quality producer is again positive. 11 The optimal R&D policy is then as follows:
Proposition 2 Under duopoly with quantity competition in stage 3, if there is a small 9 We assume regularity conditions on π ci that guarantee concavity of the welfare function.
10 Although the profit functions in the case of quantity competition are not locally concave for some qualities, the quality best-responses are, as Aoki (2003) shows, characterized by FOCs, rather than corner solutions. technology gap between firms, the optimal R&D policy is given by subsidy schedules: 
wheres
jointly eliminate the equilibrium where q 1 < q 2 .
As in the Bertrand case, there is a unique SPNE outcome where firm 1 produces a higher quality product. In the equilibrium outcome, the government provides an R&D subsidỹ s H 1 (γ) to firm 1 and imposes an R&D taxs L 2 (γ) on firm 2.
12
The situation is depicted in Figure 2 . The dotted lines areB 1 andB 2 with the optimal R&D policy. An R&D subsidys shifts the left part of B 2 to the left. As for the right parts of B 1 and B 2 ,ŝ 1 andŝ 2 shift them so that there is no intersection between them in q 1 < q 2 .
The result is partly similar to what Lahiri and Ono (1999) show. The government helps the firm with relatively better technology to choose a higher quality product at the socially optimal level. For the inferior firm, the government not only prevents it from choosing a higher quality but also taxes its R&D even if it would choose a lower quality.
The R&D subsidy on the high quality producer and the R&D tax on the low quality producer raise the degree of product differentiation. The increased product differentiation expands the market share of the high quality producer, which is welfare-improving. This is similar to Lahiri and Ono's (1988) result in the case of heterogeneous production costs among firms. They show that a cost reduction in the firm with lower marginal cost expands its market share and reduces the market share of less efficient firms and that the shift in production from less efficient firms to the more efficient firm improves social welfare. In our case, an expansion in the market share of the high quality producer improves social welfare. Our result is also related to what Symeonidis (2003b) shows.
In a mixture of horizontal and vertical differentiation, he shows that an increase in the degree of product differentiation is welfare improving.
These results contrast with the results in the Bertrand case. Recall that in the Bertrand case the government subsidizes R&D of the low quality firm as well as the high quality firm.
Since products are too much differentiated in order to soften the price competition, the quality of the low quality product is too low from social point of view. Thus, increasing the quality of low quality product and reducing the degree of product differentiation improve social welfare. Unlike the Cournot case, expanding the market share of the high quality producer is not necessarily welfare-improving by itself. Note that while the incentive to soften the price competition tends to raise the quality of the high quality product, its quality level in the unregulated market is still too low from social point of view. Therefore, a subsidy on the high quality producer is also required.
In this paper, we have examined the optimal R&D policy in a duopolistic industry where goods are differentiated in quality and firms invest in R&D to improve product qualities.
We have considered the optimal R&D subsidy/tax in a second-best environment where the government takes the market structure as given. Our focus has been on the case of asymmetric duopoly in the sense that the cost of product R&D is different across firms.
We have shown that the optimal R&D policy is characterized by firm-specific subsidy schedules that are contingent on firms' quality choices. There exist two asymmetric Nash equilibria and social welfare is higher in the equilibrium where the firm with superior technology produces a high quality product. Thus, the R&D policy needs to not only correct the distortion in firms' quality choices but also select the socially preferred equilibrium.
The firm-specific subsidy schedules induce the superior firm to produce the high quality product at the optimal quality level and the inferior firm to produce the low quality product at the optimal quality level.
The firm-specific subsidy schedule contingent on all firms' R&D activities may seem to be less practical. In the real world, however, it is observed that research grants for product R&D are allocated to projects by different amounts, depending on the evaluation of project goals and other elements of all applications. This can be interpreted as an example of the firm-specific subsidy schedule contingent on quality choices.
The results in this paper imply that it is crucial for the design of the optimal policies in vertically differentiated industries to take into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. Although it is common in the literature of vertical differentiation to focus on one equilibrium, it may obscure some important properties of the model.
For the future research, a number of potentially interesting extensions of the analysis in this paper can be considered. First of all, it will be interesting to introduce uncertainty of the outcome of R&D activities into the model. In the real world, R&D activities are typically subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Introducing uncertainty will add some additional factors to the optimal R&D policy. It may also be interesting to incorporate the dynamic aspect of R&D activities, which is sometimes emphasized in the literature. Moreover, informational asymmetry between firms and the government is sometimes pointed out as a potential obstacle for the government to implement the optimal policy. Thus, in order to discuss further the implementation of the optimal R&D policy, it may be important to take informational asymmetry into account.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Aoki (2003) It holds that 1/48k < q
61. Thus, if γ < 3/2, there exists an NE where
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Consider first the case of
2 ) be quality of the high (resp. low) quality product produced by firm 1 (resp. firm 2). Then, social welfare in this case is given by
2 ) are revenues of the high and low quality producers, respectively. Define
Totally differentiate W 1 and arrange terms to yield 
It can be shown in a similar way that q
(ii) From the FOCs for welfare maximization, (q
welfare in the case of q 1 < q 2 . Evaluate (A.2) and (
and use (A.4) to obtain
(iii) Differentiate W 1 and W 2 with respect to γ to yield, respectively,
which implies that, for a given γ, a marginal increase in γ reduces W 2 more than
for γ marginally higher than 1. Moreover, since (A.8) holds for any
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Since W is higher at S 1 , the government induces firms to choose (q 
where 
Totally differentiating FOCs (Eq. (3) and a similar equation for firm 2) yields
where Γ i is an operator such that Γ 1 = 1 and Γ 2 = γ and |D| = π Substituting them into (A.10) yields
Solve the simultaneous equations to yield the locally optimal s 1 and s 2 : 
Since 
Use these properties and Eq. (A.11) to show, after some manipulation, that
Thus, in any case it yield that d 
